The parliamentary control over government and administration in India is more theoretical than practical. In reality, the control is not as effective as it ought to be. The following factors are responsible for this:
The Parliament has neither time nor expertise to control the administration which has grown in volume as well as complexity.
Parliament’s financial control is hindered by the technical nature of the demands for grants. The parliamentarians being laymen cannot understand them properly and fully.
The legislative leadership lies with the Executive and it plays a significant role in formulating policies.
The very size of the Parliament is too large and unmanagable to be effective.
The majority support enjoyed by the Executive in the Parliament reduces the possibility of effective criticism.
The financial committees like Public Accounts Committee examines the public expenditure after it has been incurred by the Executive. Thus, they do post mortem work.
The increased recourse to ‘guillotine’ reduced the scope of financial control.
The growth of ‘delegated legislation’ has reduced the role of Parliament in making detailed laws and has increased the powers of bureaucracy.
The frequent promulgation of ordinances by the president dilutes the Parliament’s power of legislation.
The Parliament’s control is sporadic, general and mostly political in nature.
Lack of strong and steady opposition in the Parliament, and a setback in the parliamentary behaviour and ethics, have also contributed to the ineffectiveness of legislative control over administration inlndia.